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Macroprudential Policies and the Lucas Critique1 
Bálint Horváth2 and Wolf Wagner3 
 
The experience of recent years has reinforced the view that the financial system 
tends to amplify shocks over the cycle, leading to excessive lending in boom times 
and sharp contractions when economic conditions deteriorate. Common 
explanations for this are based on the fact that the players in the financial system are 
typically subject to constraints that tend to exacerbate shocks, such as borrowing 
constraints that fluctuate with asset prices, risk-sensitive capital requirements or 
remuneration schemes based on relative performance.  
Importantly, research has also identified several externalities that are at play. In 
particular, individual agents subject to borrowing constraints do not internalise that 
forced liquidations can impose negative effects on other players in the system. This 
can cause them to take more risk than is warranted for the social point of view, and 
lead to excessive fluctuations in the economy (eg Korinek, 2011). The presence of this, 
and other externalities, implies that a financial system that is not governed by 
appropriate systemic policies will not operate efficiently. There is hence a strong 
rationale for macroprudential policies. 
Based on the experience of violent crises in the past years and the strong 
theoretical backing, there has been a significant interest in designing macroprudential 
policies that limit fluctuations in the financial system: 
 The new Basel Accord incorporates capital buffers that are built up in good times 
and can be run down when economic conditions deteriorate.  
 The liquidity coverage ratio of Basel III ‒ which aims at safeguarding banks 
against short-term outflows ‒ contains a countercyclical element to the extent 
that such liquidity buffers are released in bad times.  
 On the accounting side, there is a discussion about whether mark-to-market 
accounting ‒ which has the potential to amplify the impact of asset price changes 
‒ should be suspended when prices are depressed. 
There is also a growing debate about whether monetary policy should "lean 
against the wind" with respect to the financial cycle, that is, whether the central bank 
should raise interest rates when the economy experiences excessive credit expansion 
and asset price inflation, but lower interest rates in times of significant contraction in 
lending or general stress in the financial system. 
 
1  We thank participants at the CBRT-BIS-IMF Conference on “Macroprudential Policy: Effectiveness and 
Implementation Challenges” for comments and suggestions. This paper draws heavily on the chapter 
“Unintended consequences of macroprudential policies” published in the VoxEU book on 
“Macroprudentionalism”. 
2 University of Bristol. 
3  Rotterdam School of Management and CEPR. 
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However, it is also well known that the financial system tends to react to new 
policies in surprising – and often undesirable – ways. This insight is essentially an 
application of the Lucas critique in economics; in banking circles referred to as 
Goodhart’s Law. The Lucas Critique provides a cautionary background for the 
implementation of new policies. Rational agents tend to anticipate the consequences 
of new policies and may adopt their behaviour in ways that affect the effectiveness of 
policies. New financial regulation, which is moving from a microprudential to a 
macroprudential view of the world, is based on our experiences with past crisis 
episodes and is in essence backward-looking. It may hence lead to unexpected 
outcomes when financial intermediaries change their behaviour in response to a 
modified financial architecture.  
 
The typical regulatory cycle looks as follows. An unwanted behaviour in the 
financial system is observed and this is attributed to a market failure. Policymakers 
devise a policy that specifically targets this failure. Upon implementation it is then 
discovered that the policy does not work. This is because financial institutions 
circumvent the spirit of the policy by shifting into economically equivalent activities 
that are not affected by regulation. In addition, the responses of market participants 
often lead to undesirable outcomes in other parts of the financial system.4 The 
apparent failure of regulation in turn leads to a series of new and increasingly complex 
measures, which by themselves bring about further unintended consequences. 
The lessons from the past, however, seem to have been largely forgotten when 
it comes to the design of new policies. So far little thought has been given as to how 
the financial system will react to these new measures. The experiences with previous 
policies should make us very cautious in this regard. On the face of it, we would expect 
the potential for adverse side effects to be significantly larger for system-based 
regulation. This is because such regulation is inherently more complex than traditional 
regulation that was focused on individual institutions only. The difficulty of properly 
predicting the impact of a policy rises with its complexity. High complexity also 
provides ample opportunities for financial institutions to sidestep new regulation. 
In this paper we will discuss three areas in which countercyclical policies are likely 
to have effects outside their intended realm. 
1. Systemic risk-taking 
Countercyclical policies cannot be separated from a second dimension of the 
systemic risk: the extent to which institutions in the financial system are correlated 
with each other. Such correlation can arise through various channels: herding in 
investment activities, the use of common funding sources, interconnectedness 
through interbank linkages, but also because of convergence of risk management 
practices and trading strategies.  
In particular, Horváth and Wagner (2015) have shown that countercyclical 
policies have the potential to increase cross-sectional risk. The intuition is simple. 
 
4  For instance, tight regulation in the core banking system can cause a build-up of risk in the less 
regulated shadow banking system. 
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Under countercyclical capital requirements, banks are subjected to relatively higher 
requirements when the economy is doing well but to lower requirements in bad 
times. Such requirements hence insulate banks from economy-wide fluctuations as 
they require more capital only when capital is generally abundant and less capital 
when it is costly to raise it. However, they do not insulate banks from fluctuations in 
bank-specific, idiosyncratic, conditions. In particular, a bank that focuses more on 
idiosyncratic exposures runs the risk that it will experience stress at a time when other 
banks are doing well. In this case the bank would be subject to high capital 
requirements when it is most costly. The consequence is that countercyclical policies 
increase the incentives for banks to correlate with each other. Systemic risk may thus 
increase, rather than fall. 
There is some evidence for this mechanism being at play coming from 
developing countries. While, with the exception of Spain, capital requirements have 
not been consistently used for macroprudential purposes, Frederico et al (2012) show 
that developing countries have made active use of reserve requirements over the 
business cycle. Defining countercyclicality as the correlation of reserve requirements 
with GDP, Frederico et al (2012) find that the majority of these countries used reserve 
requirements in a countercyclical fashion. 
Figure 1 plots their measure of countercyclicality against the average pair-wise 
correlation of banks in the respective countries. This figure shows a positive 
relationship between countercyclicality and bank correlation: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Countercyclicality of reserve requirements and cross-bank 
correlation Figure 1 
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Note: Countercyclicality of reserve requirements is the correlation between the cyclical component of reserve 
requirements and real GDP. Cross-bank correlation is the average pair-wise correlation of banks using weekly 
stock returns from September 2011 to September 2012. 
Source: Federico et al (2012). 
How could regulation respond to this problem? An alternative to countercyclical 
buffers is to incentivise banks to become less correlated. For example, regulators can 
impose higher capital requirements for systemic banks.5 The analysis in Horváth and 
Wagner (2015) shows that such a policy would dominate countercyclical buffers in 
the presence of incentive problems. This is because it addresses two dimensions of 
systemic risk at the same time. First, it discourages correlation among banks. Second, 
by doing so it makes the system less procyclical as more heterogeneous institutions 
will respond less strongly to aggregate shocks. In contrast ‒ as argued before ‒ 
countercyclical policies improve systemic risk along one dimension at the potential 
cost of worsening it along another. 
2. Incentives of regulators 
It is well known that financial regulation suffers from a time inconsistency problem, 
similar to the one arising for monetary policy. Ex-ante, regulators have an interest to 
be tough in order to limit risk-taking in the financial system. However, ex-post 
regulators are likely to bail out financial institutions in order to safeguard the stability 
 
5  For this, systemic risk can be quantified using measures such as the CoVar (Adrian and Brunnermeier, 
2011) or the Systemic Expected Shortfall (Acharya et al, 2012). 
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of the financial system. This time inconsistency problem is arguably a major source of 
risk-taking in the financial system.6 
Microprudential capital regulation was not prone to this problem because it was 
rule-based. Regulators could not easily deviate from the Basel standards in a 
discretionary fashion and hence there was little pressure to adjust capital 
requirements in the advent of shocks. This will all change with Basel III, which 
introduces an important discretionary element. Basel III contains guidelines for when 
countercyclical buffers should be invoked, but the ultimate decision is left to the 
regulators. To be sure, they are good reasons for this. In contrast to monetary cycles, 
it is more difficult to quantify credit cycles. It is hence important to leave significant 
room to regulators as to when to implement countercyclical policies. 
However, this discretion introduces a significant time inconsistency problem. 
Ex-post, regulators will always have incentives to reduce the impact of negative 
shocks on the financial system. They are thus likely to allow banks to run down capital 
buffers in downturns. The opposite is not likely to happen following positive shocks. 
Pressure from the financial industry and politicians will make it difficult for regulators 
to impose additional capital when excesses start to materialise. The problem is 
compounded by the fact that it is nearly impossible to accurately measure when a 
boom becomes excessive. It will hence be difficult to hold regulators accountable for 
their decisions. 
Ex-post, regulators will thus have a tendency to be lenient in their countercyclical 
policies. This is likely to create ex-ante moral hazard, in a way similar to bail-out 
expectations. Because of this, endowing regulators with a countercyclical tool can 
easily reduce welfare in the financial system (Wagner, 2015).  
3. Endogenous booms 
This area is, in our view, the most important one but also the one least understood. 
Basel III views booms and busts as discrete and exogenous events. Buffers are 
implemented when an excessive boom (by some measure) materialises, while buffers 
can be released if there is a sufficiently severe downturn. 
Cycles, however, develop over time. The response to a shock can initially be small 
but may be amplified later on. More importantly, cycles are to a large extent 
endogenous ‒ they are not simply driven by a series of fundamental shocks. In 
particular, the literature on the nexus between finance and macroeconomics has 
emphasised that there are various feedback and amplification mechanisms that can 
lead to the endogenous build-up of a boom.7  
The endogenous nature of booms has immediate consequences for 
macroprudential policies. First, anticipation of higher capital requirements if a boom 
turns excessive may prevent the boom from ever reaching the excessive stage in the 
first place. Many feedback mechanisms rely on intertemporal amplification, that is, on 
the knowledge that the impact of a shock is magnified over time. From theoretical 
 
6  See Acharya and Yorulmazer (2007) and Farhi and Tirole (2012) for analyses of time inconsistency 
leading to systemic risk on the asset and liability side, respectively. 
7  See, for instance, Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). 
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studies on bubbles, for example, it is known that in order for bubbles to exist, it is 
crucial that there is the possibility that the bubble can go on forever. The presence of 
a regulator who is committed to pricking the bubble when it reaches a certain size 
may prevent the formation of bubbles. Capital surcharges imposed in boom times 
will hence have implications for bank behavior in normal times, which in turn will 
affect the likelihood and severity of booms.  
Second, policies in pre-boom times matter as well. For instance, a policy that 
gradually increases capital requirements as the boom forms may stop the boom from 
ever becoming excessive. Discrete buffers akin to Basel III may then never have to be 
invoked. 
Conclusions 
Current regulatory initiatives are making important strides towards reducing 
fluctuations arising from systemic risk in the financial system. Based on a static 
backward-looking view of the economy, these policies address clear externalities that 
have been identified in prior research and hence should lead to higher welfare. 
However, agents in the financial system are likely to adapt to new regulation, and 
sometimes in ways that render the original policies ineffective. To avoid this, 
regulators should pay more attention to the dynamic implications of new 
macroprudential instruments. 
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